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RIGHTS LITIGATION PIGGYBACKING: LEGAL MOBILIZATION
STRATEGIES IN LGBTIQ INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE
Lucas Lixinski*
Abstract
This Article examines the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans*, Intersex,
and Queer (LGBTIQ) movement's engagement with international human
rights adjudication from the perspective of its borrowing from or
piggybacking on the strategies and tactics of other international social
movements for historically disadvantaged groups, particularly race,
gender, and indigenous people. Piggybacking has shaped the rights goals
of the LGBTIQ movement, which are then translated into the language
of international human rights law. In this translation process, certain
objectives get foregrounded at the expense of others, and the movement
essentializes itself in the pursuit of strategic gains, often to lasting
unintended consequences that harm the movement itself. In mapping
these trends, this Article argues that social movement advocates would
do well to be more mindful of the piggybacking's strategic costs,
particularly as new international rights-oriented social movements
emerge in areas like disability rights and the rights of older persons.
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INTRODUCTION

The international litigation of human rights by social groups poses
many challenges. However, it still fulfills the key purpose of international
human rights law, which is to provide an avenue of recourse beyond the
nation-state. In the current state of the rights of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexual,
Trans*,' Intersex and Queer (LGBTIQ), and other minorities grouped in
relation to their sexual or gender identity,2 the importance of having
remedies that bypass and transcend the state is paramount. In many
countries around the world, LGBTIQ individuals are persecuted,
discriminated against, even murdered. 3 Often these acts are, if not
encouraged, at least condoned by the state. 4 International human rights
1 The use of the asterisk in "trans*," as opposed to the word "transgender," is meant to
be "a shorthand way of signaling that you were trying to be inclusive of many different
experiences and identities rooted in acts of crossing, and not get hung up on fighting over labels

or conflicts rooted in different ways of being different from gender norms." Therefore, I adopt
this terminology in this Article. SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY: THE ROOTS OF
TODAY'S REVOLUTION at 11 (2017).
2. Id. The acronym is constantly evolving, and now encompasses at least nine letters,
according to one recent account. These are LGBTIQQAA (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans*, intersex,
queer, questioning, asexual, and allies). I choose to focus on LGBTIQ partly for convenience, and

partly because the identities of the last three categories (questioning, asexual, and allies) has not
been the subject of international rights litigation to the best of my knowledge.
3. See generally LUCAS RAMON MENDOS, INT'L LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS, AND
INTERSEx ASs'N (ILGA), ILGA REPORT ON STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA (13th ed. 2019),
https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGAState Sponsored Homophobia_2019.pdf;
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH, #OUTLAWED - THE LOVE THAT DARE NOT SPEAK ITS NAME, http://internap.hrw.org/

features/features/lgbt_ laws/.
4. See, e.g., Samuel Osborne, Chechnya Leader Ramzan Kadyrov Says He Condones
Honour Killings of Gay People, THE INDEPENDENT (July 19, 2017), https://www.independent.co
.uk/news/world/europe/chechnya-ramzan-kadyrov-leader-gay-people-honour-ki I lings-relativesmma-chechen-detain-russia-a7849346.html); DANIELE PALETTA, ILGA, KENYA #REPEAL162
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institutions can remind the state of their commitments to protect these
persons, despite a history of "exclusionary impulses" in the area of
LGBTIQ rights.5
Particularly important institutions in this respect are human rights
(quasi-)judicial mechanisms. 6 For one, their decisions are based on a
7
specific body of law, and their decisions are often binding upon states,
unlike the recommendations of political human rights bodies like the
Human Rights Council. Likewise, they provide a direct avenue for
redress to aggrieved individuals, allowing for the use of powerful
personal narratives to enliven the struggles of an entire group of people.
8
So, even if "rights do not offer us truth, they offer us tactics."
But highlighting, however indirectly, the struggle of a group through
the plight of an individual also presents challenges. First among those is
the balancing act within the case between the individual victim's rights
and the interest of an entire social movement. Advocates have pointed
out in these circumstances that the "focus must be on the perfect case, not
the imperfect clients,"9 thus underscoring that individual situations often
are pushed to the background to advance a movement's claims, even if
litigation necessitates a focus on individual circumstances. Secondly,
RULING: A STATEMENT BY PAN AFRICA ILGA (May 24, 2019), https://ilga.org/kenya-repeal-162ruling-pan-africa-ilga-statement; see also Susan Dicklitch et al., Building a Barometer of Gay
Rights (BGR): A Case Study of Uganda and the Persecutionof Homosexuals, 24 HUM. RTS. Q.

448 (2012).
5. Bonny Ibhawoh, Human Rightsfor Some: Universal Human Rights, Sexual Minorities,
and the Exclusionary Impulse, 69 INT'L J. 612 (2014).
6. For the purposes of this Article, I focus on two judicial and three quasi-judicial
mechanisms. The judicial mechanisms are: (1) the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
with respect to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and (2) the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) with respect to the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR), who have the jurisdiction to issue judgments that are binding on the parties. The quasijudicial mechanisms, on the other hand, can only issue recommendations or findings on the merits
with non-binding character. These are (1) the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACmHR) also with respect to the ACHR; (2) the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights (ACHPR) with respect to the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; and (3) the
Human Rights Committee (HRC) that oversees the implementation of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,

1969, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9

1.L.M. 99 (hereinafter ACHR);

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.
T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (hereinafter ECHR); African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; 21 I.L.M. 58 (hereinafter Banjul Charter); International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 6 I.L.M. 368
(hereinafter ICCPR).
7. With the exception of quasi-judicial bodies, as indicated above. However, my goal here
is to establish a broader adjudicatory discourse of human rights jurisprudence on LGBTIQ issues
and social movements.
8. Kay Lalor, Constituting Sexuality: Rights, Politics and Power in the Gay Rights

Movement, 15 INT'L J. HUM. RTs. 683, 695 (2011).
9.

DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

LAWRENCE

V. TEXAS

143 (2012).

3

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 31 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 1

276

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol. 31I

there is the uneasy relationship between identity politics and the litigation
of individual rights in international law, whereby the identity-based
claims of an entire group get compressed into one individual's identity
for litigation. In this translation process, internal diversity, for instance,
gets lost in favor of a homogenized, idealized identity represented by the
individual victim bringing the case. 10 Nonetheless, LGBTIQ social
movements have, over time, stimulated and benefitted from international
human rights law, both through political and (quasi-)judicial fora. This
piece focuses on the latter.
My descriptive thesis is that LGBTIQ rights as a social movement
have piggybacked on strategies and tactics" of other social movements
and their rights claims, and these have shifted over time. The same has
happened in international rights jurisprudence. In examining cases
brought by LGBTIQ individuals, or concerning LGBTIQ matters more
generally, I seek to map out how certain rights benefit some aspirations
of a social movement, but often in detriment of others. Normatively, I
argue that the judicialization of LGBTIQ rights and other rights-seeking
social movements would do well to be more mindful of the strategic costs
of the victories in individual cases, based on specific rights, since the
victories in some areas make commitments about LGBTIQ identity that
do not necessarily sit well with other aspects of the rights movement.
Therefore, to map out the use of these tactics contributes to thinking more
broadly about LGBTIQ identities and strategies as read through the prism
of international human rights law and its adjudication. This thinking
allows for more self-aware tactics and strategies for this movement,
which may also benefit other emerging movements for historically
disadvantaged groups, like persons with disabilities, and, more recently,
older persons.
Naturally, I do not mean to say that all cases brought on LGBTIQ
issues are part of a masterplan of strategic litigation.1 2 Nor do I suggest
10. Rafael Carrano Lelis & Gabriel Coutinho Galil, Direito Internacional Monocromatico:
Previsdo e Aplicagdo dos Direitos LGBTI na Ordem Internacional, 15 BRAZILIAN J. INT'L L. 278
(2018).
11. There is an importantdifference between tactics and strategies, with the former meaning
short-term gains to win an argument or case, and the former longer-term projects of emancipation.

As Robert Knox points out, this difference is often missed by (critical) international lawyers. See
Robert Knox, Strategy and Tactics, 21 FINNISH Y.B. OF INT'L L, 193, 194-95 (2012). Specifically,
in the context of international human rights law, see BEN GOLDER, FOUCAULT AND THE POLITICS
OF RIGHTS (2015), particularly Chapter 4, titled "Rights between Tactics and Strategy."
12. Even if strategic litigation via international courts to change domestic law does in fact

happen, as argued by Giulia Dondoli, LGBTI Activism Influencing Foreign Legislation, 16 MELB.
J. INT'L L. 124 (2015). See also Mayur Suresh, The Right to be Public: India's LGBT Movement
Builds an Argument About Privacy, 20 AusTL. J. OF ASIAN L. 1 (2019) (arguing that the 2018
India Supreme Court Judgment decriminalizing sodomy "and the constitutional arguments that
were presented were produced by the LGBT movement" and "not a product of single petition

[nor] the creation of individual lawyers").
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3
that the LGBTIQ movement is uniform around the world.' Rather, what
this mapping exercise seeks to show is how, by choosing and borrowing
from certain successful tactics of other social movements, a specific
movement can advance its causes, either by path dependency or shortcircuiting. The former, path dependency, finds less resistance but suffers
from repeating the same blind spots of previous movements. The latter
can advance a movement's claims more rapidly in theory, but often finds
too much resistance, and the stakes are higher, particularly in the event
of a negative outcome.
In weaving the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies
together, I am not particularly concerned with some contingencies, such
as whether the case is the direct product of strategic litigation
domestically, who exactly brought the case, the specific location, or type
of body entertaining the case. These contingencies are sidestepped in
favor of a more impressionistic mapping that does not require proving
direct causal links; rather, I intend to provide a rough roadmap, which
might be transplanted to other contexts like disability and the rights of
older persons, aligning with the idea of scholarship as a valuable pathway
for advancing causes of social groups.14
In what follows, I introduce the idea of social movement borrowing
by looking at historical literature on the LGBTIQ movement that
discusses the influence of other movements while discussing the role of
13. On this variety, see generally MARTEL, infra note 15. With respect to another
contingency, time, even though I subscribe to a general narrative of sequencing in litigation, I do
not think that a right litigated in, say, the 1970s before one body, and the 1990s in another, are
fundamentally different because of the status of the LGBTIQ movement around the world. Rather,
to the extent those cases respond to a domestic (or, at most, regional) state of affairs, it is possible
to make them comparable even if they are decades apart (which also partially responds to why the
specific forum is not a major concern in how I structure the narrative). Likewise, this atemporal
analysis means that I use the term LGBTIQ without taking into account the internal evolution of
the movement to include (or exclude) certain subgroups at certain points in time. I do so not
because the internal evolution of the movement does not matter; it has deep implications for the
ways in which rights litigation is structured, particularly in promoting the visibility or invisibility
of certain groups over others within the movement. Therefore, the history of a movement is
important, particularly in mapping the ways in which borrowing and piggybacking has happened.
Rather, this atemporal treatment of the acronym ties with the purpose of my intervention: rather
than a historical intervention about the LGBTIQ movement, I use history to make a case for the
ways in which the LGBTIQ movement (in whatever configuration) has borrowed from other
movements at any point in time, and then used international human rights litigation. I do so
because it is one example of a social movement using international human rights law. In other
words, since my primary focus is on legal mobilization in international human rights by emerging
social movements, using LGBTIQ rights as a case study, rather than an intervention about the
LGBTIQ movement itself, to dwell on the internal evolution of the movement with respect to its
membership, as opposed to its strategies, seems counterproductive. That said, at times the shift in
membership does matter, as the analysis below will show.

14. Nadine Strossen, Reflections on the EssentialRole of Legal Scholarshipin Advancing
Causes of Citizen Groups, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 505 (2004-2005).
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identity politics in rights litigation and the question of individualization
of claims of a broader movement. After that, I discuss international rights
litigation tactics by looking at the spectrum of LGBTIQ cases across
international human rights bodies. I then use this description to offer a
roadmap of international rights litigation for minority social movements
that can be useful in other contexts. Lastly, I offer some concluding
remarks, including some directions for further research.
I. SOCIAL MOVEMENT BORROWING

While it is impossible to account for a full history of LGBTIQ social
movements around the world in the 20th century, let alone more broadly
the history of social movements in pursuit of human rights for historically
disenfranchised groups, it is important to highlight a few key themes that
emerge repeatedly. 5 For our purposes, I focus on social movement
borrowing, defined as how emerging movements adopt and adapt the
language and tactics from other movements. Relatedly, I also focus on
the use of rights as weapons, and ultimately legal mobilization through
strategic litigation. I am wary of essentializing movements and
disenfranchised groups through this analysis, but, as we will see below,

15. While the account below is admittedly slanted towards authorities referring to AngloAmerican realities, the trends they outlined are confirmed in literature relating to other contexts.
See,

&

e.g., RICHARD PARKER, BENEATH THE EQUATOR: CULTURES OF DESIRE, MALE
HOMOSEXUALITY, AND EMERGING GAY COMMUNITIES IN BRAZIL (1999); Sabrina Ragone

Valentina Volpe, An Emerging Right to a "Gay" Family Life? The Case Oliari v. Italy in a
Comparative Perspective, 17 GERMAN L. J. 451 (2016) (comparing Spain, Portugal, Italy, and
France); Hernan M Duarte, El Poder de Discriminary los Derechos de las MinoriasLGBTI, 7
REVISTA COSTARRICENSE DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 61 (2017) (covering a range of Central
American examples); Michble Finck, The Role ofHuman Dignity in Gay Rights Adjudication and
Legislation:A ComparativePerspective, 14 I-CON 26 (2016) (comparing United States, Canada,

South Africa, Mexico, Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom); Nathan Madson
& Jenny Odegard, Cause of Action: Using International Human Rights Law to Advance Gay
Rights, 70 NAT'L LAw. GUILD REV. 65 (2013) (focusing on Russia); Kerman Calvo & Gracia

Trujillo, Fightingfor Love Rights: Claims and Strategies of the LGBT Movement in Spain, 14
SEXUALrrIES 562 (2011) (focusing on Spain); Solomon Eborah, AfricanisingHuman Rights in the
21st Century: Gay Rights, African Values and the Dilemma of the African Legislator, 1 INT'L
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 110 (2012) (focusing broadly on Africa); Adam Kretz, From "Kill the Gays"
to "Kill the Gay Rights Movement": The Future of HomosexualityLegislation in Africa, 11 Nw.
J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 207 (2013) (focusing on Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Malawi); Adetoun Adebanjo,
Culture, Morality and the Law: Nigeria's Anti-Gay Law in Perspective, 15 INT'L J.
DISCRIMINATION L. 256 (2015) (focusing on Nigeria); Suresh, supra note 12 (focusing on India);
Venetia Kantsa, The Price of Marriage: Same-Sex Sexualities and Citizenship in Greece, 17
SEXUALITIES 818 (2014) (focusing on Greece). That said, at the same time I am wary of attempting
to universalize LGBTIQ experiences. As Michael Bronski has put it, even though Western
influences and the rise of human rights have been important factors in the advancement of
LGBTIQ causes, a search for universality is "politically suspect." MICHAEL BRONSKI, Foreword
to FREDERIC MARTEL, GLOBAL GAY: How GAY CULTURE IS CHANGING THE WORLD vii-viii (2018).
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essentialization is often deployed by these groups as a tactical tool. It may
be an inevitable cost of the decision to litigate.
The term "social movement" has been criticized for encompassing too
much. 16 Still, it is generally seen as standing for "a distinctive form of
contentious politics" that has become commonplace, particularly in the
21st century.1 7 Charles Tilly, a key theorist on social movements, states
they contain three elements: (1) collective claims against governmental
or other target authorities; (2) claim-making performances; and (3)
"public representations of the cause's worthiness, unity, numbers, and
commitment." 18 Legal mobilization around human rights can be seen as
straddling the first and second categories, but, as discussed below, it also
speaks (at least in the LGBTIQ space) to the third element, particularly
"worthiness," with unintended consequences.
Legal mobilization through strategic litigation inevitably constrains
the possibilities of a movement, as it aligns claims to specific forms of
resistance. 19 Legal claims and jurisprudential technologies flatten
complex factual backgrounds, and in the LGBTIQ context, often ignore
20
"the presence of gender, race, age, and class pulsing in the background."
Likewise, the same tactics can be used against rights, particularly in the
21
LGBTIQ sphere, as discussed further below. But social movements
create legal opportunity structures, which are valuable ways of pursuing
the expansion of rights. 2 2 That said, there is an imminent risk that the
focus on litigation can take politics off the table, as the rights that can be
legally invoked and their constraints shape the possibilities of social
23
movements in restrictive and de-politicizing ways.
Social movements' claims are often combined in three kinds: (1)
program claims that support or reject the target authority's proposed
actions in relation to the movement; (2) identity claims that assert the
force of the movement, particularly its worthiness, unity, numbers, and
commitment; and (3) standing claims that connect the movement to other
political actors such as excluded minorities, particularly relevant for our
purposes. 24 Identity claims accompany social movements at least as far

16. CHARLES TILLY, SoCIAL MOVEMENTS, 1768-2004 ix (2004).

17. Id. at 3.
18. Id. at 7.
19. MICHAEL

MCCANN, Litigation and Legal Mobilization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND POLITICS 522, 532-33 (Gregory A. Caldeira et al. eds., 2008).
20. CARPENTER, supra note 9, at xii.

21. Id. at 534.
22. ELLEN ANN ANDERSON, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION (2005).
23. GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?

(1991).
-

24. TILLY, supra note 16, at 12.
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back as the 19th century,25 meaning that the focus on the 20th and 21st
centuries can be misleading. Still, a key difference this Article accounts
for is the use of international human rights (quasi-)adjudicatory
mechanisms, which did not exist until the second half of the 20th century.
A. LGBTIQ as a Borrower and Piggybacker
With respect to borrowing, the LGBTIQ movement's history is often
told by drawing parallels with race, gender, indigenous rights, and other
movements. 26 Even the theorizing of social movements is often done in a
U.S. context by aligning race, feminism, and LGBTIQ movements along
the same continuum. 27 These movements shared their intention to seek
citizenship in a state. While the race and feminist movements did not ask
for approval from society (in the way the LGBTIQ movement does), there
were shared goals of protection from violence, toleration, human liberty,
and equal access. At the same time, pursuit of these goals often dispensed
with goals like economics and cultural validation, which were picked up
again by the more identity-based LGBTIQ movement,2 8 borrowing from
other movements with also significant economic and identity
components, like the labor movement in countries like Australia, 2 9 and
even the indigenous movement. 30
The connection of the LGBTIQ movement to gender is well-known,
particularly through groups like the Lavender Menace, that showcased
how the feminist movement left lesbians behind to de-radicalize the
movement.3 1 The connection between the feminist and LGBTIQ
movements is often made in connection to privacy rights and control over
the body, but, as discussed below, it also extends to other domains. On
25. Id. at 71. However, there are critiques of the alignment of race and LGBTIQ rights,
which characterize the LGBTIQ movement's rapprochement to race rights as "cultural
appropriation." See KENYON FARROw, Is Gay Marriage Anti-Black???, in AGAINST EQUALITY:
QUEER REVOLUTION NOT MERE INCLUSION 33,41 (Ryan Conrad ed., 2014). Other critiques of this

alignment claim LGBTIQ communities are artificial minorities, which can "steal" the rights won
by other historically disadvantaged groups, like women, persons of African-descent and other
racial origins, persons with disabilities, and older persons. See CARPENTER, supra note 9, at 33-

34 (citing church leaders in Texas).
26. LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION

xiv

(2012). See also

STRYKER, supra note 1, at 82, 84 (describing how the gay and trans movements in the mid-1960s
used very similar techniques as the race civil rights movement in the U.S., and notably at the same
time). Stryker also notes "the extent to which the tactics of minority rights activism cross-fertilized
different movements. [...] Many of the queer people [engaged] were themselves people of color,
and they were not 'borrowing' a tactic developed by another movement."
27. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at xiv-xv.
28. Id. at xv.

29.
(2013).

Liz Ross, REVOLUTION Is FOR US: THE LEFT AND GAY LIBERATION IN AUSTRALIA viii

30. Id. at 73-74; see also Lelis & Galil, supra note 10, at 292-93.
31. Making the connection also in Australia, see ROss, supra note 29, at 49.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol31/iss3/1

8

Lixinski: Rights Litigation Piggybacking: Legal Mobilization Strategies in

RIGHIS LITIGA 7/ON PIGGYBACKING

20201

281

race, though, the comparison is less explored globally, even if it is an
issue raised in the context of strategic litigation. A case on LGBTIQ
discrimination in the southern United States, for instance, surveys the
history of discrimination against racial minorities to make a comparison
in the area of hate crimes. 3 2 In countries like Australia, it is welldocumented that the politics and practice of the LGBTIQ movement drew
on feminist, race, and leftist movements.
There is a sense of alignment and mutual support among different
social movements. People draw their sense of identity from groups they
are already in, which creates a positive sense of self and gives them an
33
incentive to collectively change the way society perceives them. The
Stonewall riots, for instance, included on their final day the support of
left-leaning straight movements (economics), alongside Black Panthers
(race), "and a general sampling of the rebellious in the New York area.
The word was out: the last great twentieth-century movement has
happened." 34 Emerging movements need those alliances because the
identity that movements seek to protect is at its most fragile when the
movement is a stand-alone one. These alliances, however, are often
temporary, as the use of rights as weapons discussed below shows. They
also create the question of how to prioritize among the different goals
when the political surplus generated by these alliances needs to be
expended.35
One notable difference concerning other social. movements, though,
speaks to identity and strategic essentialism, further discussed below.
Specifically, movements like race and gender shared many aspirations
with LGBTIQ movements. Still, the former two movements were seldom
characterized as "sinful, crazy, criminal, and subversive," meaning that
they could more easily access the benefits of security, freedom, and
equality. LGBTIQ persons, on the other hand, had to first fight a battle
for acceptance of their identity, a battle that was heightened for LGBTIQ
women and LGBTIQ persons of color. 3 6 For example, in the U.S. context,
registration was denied to a gay legal defense fund, on the grounds that
they were not comparable to a similar association protecting Puerto
Ricans because gays did something wrong, and representing
homosexuals, therefore, could not be seen as benevolent or charitable.
37
Such a conclusion strongly echoes Christian ethics regarding charities.

32.

ROBERTA KAPLAN, THEN COMES MARRIAGE: UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR AND THE

DEFEAT OF DOMA 307 (2015).
33. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at xv.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 105.
at 111.
at 110-11.
at 148.
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Another instance that differentiates the LGBTIQ movement from
other social movements is the problem of free-riders or people who can
"pass" as non-LGBTIQ. 3 8 These instances dwindle numbers and unity,
and also speak to the importance of "coming out" as a key political act in
this social movement, 39 a tactic also relevant in indigenous movements
in countries like Japan. 4 0 Crucially, free riders and "passing" can also
make alliances with other social movements more difficult by narrowing
the goals of the movement away from broader social justice causes
because its chosen litigation victims or "respectable" representatives are
often those who can "pass."
The relative "non-conspicuousness" of the movement has, in some
instances, acted as a means to mobilize resources and outrage at the
expense of intersectionality 4 1 or even engagement with other minorities.
Looking at the U.S. example, Linda Hirshman suggested that an
important reason why certain organizations succeeded is that they
represented gay white men, who suddenly realized "they did not have the
privilege they thought they had." 4 2 In the trans* context, Susan Stryker
has shown that "it is often the most privileged elements of a population
affected by a particular civil injustice or social oppression who have the
opportunity to organize first. In organizing around the one thing that
interferes with or complicates their privilege, their organizations tend to
reproduce that very privilege." 43 To put it another way, conspicuousness
aids the movement itself by dealing with the issue of free riders, while at
the same time enabling the movement to construe causes that do not rely
on a certain reified identity that reinforces certain forms of privilege.
Despite this uneasy tension with the reproduction of privilege,
LGBTIQ advocates have often used the idea that their struggle was based
on the unity of all oppressed peoples-race, gender, sexual orientation,
economic status.44 That confluence has assisted with making allies across
38. Id. at 80, 171.
39. Id. at 188. But coming out as a political strategy is not without its critics in the LGBTIQ
movement. See PHILLIP BRIAN HARPER, PRIVATE AFFAIRS: CRITICAL VENTURES IN THE CULTURE

OF SOCIAL RELATIONS 116 (1999) (arguing that coming out buys into a category of normalization
and normality that is inconsistent with queer theory's objective to query and redefine normal
itself).

40. Jude Isabella, The Untold Story of Japan's First People, SAPIENS (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.sapiens.org/archaeology/ainu-prejudice-pride/.

41. Intersectionality arose initially in gender studies and is the idea of overlapping and
multiple identities (for instance, a person who is a woman, and also a person of color). The key
insight of intersectionality for our purposes is that identities are not unitary, they overlap, and
those overlapping identities have significant impacts in the articulation of claims by socially
disadvantaged groups. Jennifer C. Nash, Re-Thinking Intersectionality, 89 FEMINIST REV. 1

(2008).
42. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 196.
43. STRYKER, supra note 1, at 77.
44. Ross, supra note 29, at 91.
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a range of movements, but it has left a significant question unanswered.
Namely, whether efforts were aimed at leveling the playing field in favor
of equal rights, or whether LGBTIQ persons were entitled to special
rights.
At the heart of the question are two issues: first is a tension concerning
the alignment with other movements, since special rights claims can align
strategies in certain respects, but may also compromise personal alliances
by creating distance between movements and putting strain on
intersectionality. Intersectionality, in this respect, is meant to be a bridge
across movements. Still, movements often pit themselves against one
another, in what becomes a contest for validity,. particularly in the
translation of claims into special rights. 45
Second is the question of whether LGBTIQ people's goals are to
"integrate" into mainstream society or be allowed to lead their lives
separately. Historically, the same question also plagued the race
movement in the U.S., at times oscillating between separatism and
46
integration (Martin Luther King, Jr. believed in the latter). For LGBTIQ
identity, to argue for sameness at one point in the movement meant to
47
concede the "abnormality" of identity, and sameness was rejected. It
was the debate on marriage equality that brought equal treatment back to
the center of the conversation, in many respects. It sidelined special rights
arguments in favor of a specific construction of equality. Karen Engle has
argued that the focus on equality erases the need to understand LGBTIQ
existence, thus being preferred by governmental authorities (who can
bypass accommodation) and advocates (who get quicker results). In
doing so, though, this erasure can have troubling consequences, and
therefore a thick description of special facts necessarily calls for special
rights for LGBTIQ persons. 4 8 In other words, "becoming as mainstream
49
as possible is unlikely to lead to much change in the status quo."
At the same time, legal mobilization in an international human rights
context requires framing of contexts under identifiable rights, and it may
50
be that aspiring to sameness presents a clear tactical advantage. As
Martel has put it, aspirational sameness helps de-Westernize and
universalize the conversation by couching it in the language of human
rights, and "LGBT rights are an intrinsic[] human rights, beyond any
controversy or polemic, because they are indeed about the applicationof
45. I am grateful to Rosemary Kayess for this insight.

46. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 91.
47. Id. at 38.
48. Karen Engle, What's So Special About Special Rights?, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1265, 1267

(1998).
49. Id. at 1302.
50. Not to mention the legal debates surrounding standard-setting and the creation of new
rights versus the utilization of existing ones, as has been the case in the context of the rights of
older persons, discussed below. I am thankful to Annie Herro for this insight.
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existing rights-the rights to life, freedom, personal safety, equal
protection against any form of discrimination, freedom of expression,
privacy, and so on ... ".51 Put another way, while the binaries of
sameness and special rights need to be contested, these same categories
can be utilized,5 2 and there is room for (quasi-)adjudicatory bodies to
emphasize idiosyncrasies of historically disadvantaged groups
represented by social movements (like the LGBTIQ group).5 3
Concerning intersectionality, the matter also speaks to the unity of the
movement, a key requirement for its success. Fractures in the LGBTIQ
movement have come up once people realized that just being gay together
was not enough to erase all differences. Di Otto, for instance, made the
case that just being a lesbian is not itself a radical position. That thinking
so is a misunderstanding, 54 a position also supported by trans*
advocates.5 5 These questions of identity and what it means to choose
among different paths as a strategic matter in rights claims will be
discussed below. However, it is important to bear in mind that both claims
for equal and special rights are often on the table and in tension with one
another, complicating the possible uses of international human rights
laws and institutions.
B. Rights as Weapons and the Alliances and Enemies of a Movement
The use of rights language and tools is an important element to support
the claims of social movements. These rights can be used as shields, or
also as weapons, as Clifford Bob has shown. 56 The call for rights creates
a form of "cognitive liberation" that fosters a sense of group solidarity
and unity. 57 Used as a rallying cry, the language of rights relies on being
human, universal, absolute, apolitical, and the existence of a wrong.5
This rhetoric also helps identify allies, as the use of UN women's
conferences by lesbian and gay groups shows. 59 Rights can also be used
as shields and parries to counter threats, 60 as camouflage to mask the

51. MARTEL, supra note 15, at 253 (emphasis in original).
52. Matthew Waites, Critique of 'Sexual Orientation'and 'Gender Identity' in Human
Rights Discourse: Global Queer Politics Beyond the Yogyakarta Principles, 15 CONTEMP. POL.

137, 139 (2009).
53. Paula Gerber & Joel Gory, The UN Human Rights Committee and LGBT Rights: What

is it Doing? What Could it be Doing?, 14 HuM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 403 (2014).
54. Cited by Ross, supra note 29, at 106.
55. STRYKER, supra note 1, at 5.
56. CLIFFORD BOB, RIGHTS AS WEAPONS: INSTRUMENTS OF CONFLICT, TOOLS OF POWER 5

(2019).
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

at 29-30.
at 27-28.
at 32.
at 51-61.
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62
motives of certain groups, 6 1 as spears to overturn laws, as dynamite to
destroy cultures, 63 as blockades to suppress,64 or as wedges to break
social movements. 65
The tactic of rights as dynamite has been used to victimize LGBTIQ
groups in several countries, as it uses the rights of the majority to depict
the other group as disruptive of the nation's morality, culture, or
sovereignty. 66 This tactic is more likely to work in domestic contexts,
where the majority's hold on power is more stable, but it often fails
internationally given the lack of commitment of international institutions
to domestic majorities' values and the counter-majoritarian impulses of
international human rights law and institutions. 67 There is a nesting doll
feature to this tactic, 68 though, particularly in the LGBTIQ context, with
the rights of sexual minorities seen as an imposition from the outside that
can disrupt domestic cultures. 69 As a result, LGBTIQ groups are often
resistant to engage with this tactic, as well as to be portrayed as victims,
in no small part "because they are seldom consulted by outsiders about
the wisdom of imposing 'universal' rights, with their maximal goals and
minimal time frames." 70 The use of rights as dynamite is thus a powerful
reminder of the need not to over-generalize the possibilities of human
rights litigation.
Thinking of the different uses of rights as weapons also problematizes
the unity of social movements that, as indicated below, is a key element
to their success. Specifically, to think of rights as blockades or wedges
reminds us of how rights can be used to fragment social movements,
whether it is the historical discomfort of women's rights movements with
lesbians7 1 and trans* women, 72 or even the use of rights based on medical
interventions as a means to entice trans* advocates away from other
aspects of the LGBTIQ movement, 73 which also comes in response to the

61. Id. at 65-92.
62. Id. at 93-117.
63. Id. at 118-47.
64. Id. at 151-84.
65. Id. at 185-207.

66. Id. at 118-19.
67. Id. at 128-29.
68. On a critique of use of metaphors as juris generative and arguing for the possibilities of
clashing multiple metaphors in the human rights law context, see Ben Golder, Thinking Human
Rights Through Metaphor, 31 LAW & LITERATURE 301, 324-25 (2019).
69. BoB, supranote 56, at 132-39.

70. Id. at 147.
71. HLRSHMAN,supranote26,at 112.
72. BOB, supra note 56, at 151, 175-82.
73. 1 am thankful to Jed Horner for this insight. But it is also important to note the unease
that some trans* advocates and scholars report with respect to the medical profession. As Susan
Stryker puts it, "medical science has always been a two-edged sword-its representatives'
willingness to intervene has gone hand in hand with their power to define and judge. Far too often,
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gay rights movement's rejection of trans* identity and claims. 74 The gay
rights movement at one point also excluded lesbians (who were thought
to be better off with the feminist movement),7 5 and even race, all in the
name of "respectability" and integration. This was intended to promote a
language of equal rights using the language of economic affluence to
speak to heterosexual allies, 76 showcasing the difficulties of
intersectionality. These examples remind us that intersectionality can
both promote better relationships across different social movements or be
leveraged against rights causes by splintering allied groups and
undermining the unity of these movements.
Overall, thus, to think of rights as weapons reminds us that rights are
relatively empty tools that can be directed at myriad political goals. 77
Legal mobilization, as part of these tactics, is particularly concerned with
the use of rights as spears, and international human rights (quasi-) courts'
counter-majoritarian impulses are an important tendency upon which this
strategy relies. 7 8 It means broadly the idea that the invocation of legal
norms to promote a policy or social reform. 79 For the specific purposes
of this Article, it means using international human rights bodies to
generate mandates for a state, region, and even the entire world on what
compliance with international legal obligations means for specific social
movements.

access to medical services for transgender people has depended on constructing transgender
phenomena as symptoms of a mental illness or physical malady, partly because 'sickness' is the
condition that typically legitimizes medical intervention." STRYKER, supra note 1, at 52.
74. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 117, 157. Trans* people were initially a full-blown part of
the rest of the gay movement, exclusion came later when they were made sacrificial lambs (and
eventually re-integrated). "Transgender activists, three decades later leading their own militant

identity movement and demanding the support of the gay and lesbian establishment, attribute the
divide to this development. How did it come to be, they ask, reasonably, that a movement revived

in part by the queens at the Stonewall Inn in 1969 found them unpalatable allies to soon afterward?
As soon as the formerly despised gay men got a little power, they developed a heavily masculine
representation of self, leaving little space for their comrades who also challenged norms of
gender." See also Amy L. Stone, More than Adding a T: American Lesbian and Gay Activists'
Attitudes Towards TransgenderInclusion, 12 SExUALITIEs 334 (2009) (arguing that gay men have

a harder time accepting trans* people than lesbian women).
75. See generally ERIC MARCUS, MAKING GAY HISTORY:

THE HALF-CENTURY FIGHT FOR

LESBIAN AND GAY EQUAL RIGHTS (2002).

76. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 220.
77. BOB, supra note 56, at 210.

78. Id. at 96-97.
79. Lisa vanhala, Legal Mobilization, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-97801997562
23-0031.xml.
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C. Legal Mobilization Based on Identity
The key advantage of legal mobilization in this space is that it allows
for the penetration of international human rights discourses as a means to
force a shift in domestic law and policy, and also to force a public
conversation that paints the rights holders in a sympathetic light. A key
disadvantage is to make an individual case a stand-in for an entire
disadvantaged group, which leads to essentializing identity in strategic
ways. 80 In other words, it becomes a process whereby "subjects selfsurrender to a model that has oppressed them for centuries, a model
characterized by 'juridical normalization [...]'."81
Specifically, with respect to identity, the characterization of LGBTIQ
(or at least LGB and Q) identity at one point as based on behavior and
feelings "made it uniquely vulnerable to persecution and much harder to
defend than the congenital, morally neutral characteristics like race and
gender." 8 2 Therefore, the protection of the performance of LGBTIQ
identity was laden with morality and often a sore point in strategizing.
Certain rights tactics were deployed to safeguard these performances first
as a matter of privacy, but, in doing so, they became anchored on a notion
83
of "respectability" that essentializes LGBTIQ identity.
In the LGBTIQ space, the use of identity as a means of pursuing rights
claims is complicated by the fact that LGBTIQ identity is seldom innate
or learned from established history or family structures, needing to be
constructed. 84 Relatedly, the establishment of difference has often been a
key part of the movement, even if attempts to "normalize" LGBTIQ
identity have also existed from the early days, drawing on the need for
85
respectability as a currency for rights among affluent elites. This need
for respectability speaks to what Linda Hirshman characterizes as "the
four horsemen of the gay apocalypse--Crazy, Sinful, Criminal, and
Subversive-[which] still blocked their passage to full social equality
[after Stonewall and its advances]." 8 6
80. On strategic essentialism in the Indigenous rights movement, see KAREN ENGLE, THE
PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: CULTURE, RIGHTS, STRATEGY (2010)
[hereinafter ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE]; see also Knox, supra note 11, at 201-15.
81. Francesca Romana Ammaturo, The Council of Europe and the Creation of LGBT
Identities Through Language and Discourse: A CriticalAnalysis of Case Law and Institutional
Practices, 23 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 575, 585 (2019) (citing Mariano Croce, Desiring What the Law
Desires: A Semiotic View of the Normalization of Homosexual Sexuality, 14 LAW, CULTURE AND
ELUSIVE

THE HUMANITIES 402 (2014)).
82. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 46.
83. See generally Calvo & Trujillo, supra note 15, at 565 (arguing that the evolution of
social movements in Spain "has steadily embraced modes of claims-making that are becoming
increasingly desexualized").
84. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 25.
85. Id. at 40-41.

86. Id at 129.
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In attacking each of these labels, a number of different tactics have
been deployed. The crazy label was attacked by engagement with the
psychiatric profession, which came at the cost of not "being able to
invoke any of the arguments like equality and privacy that constrain the
actual liberal state"" since the engagement was primarily about declassifying conduct and identity as a disease. Fighting this label also
meant a disengagement between gay and trans* advocates, since the latter
were still caught in a fight with the medical establishment for many
decades to come. 8 8 The LGBTIQ's tactic of deploying "tragic anecdotes"
as a means of pursuing rights claims was also borne out of confrontations
with the psychiatric establishment. 89 With respect to the sinful label, the
tactic was to create separate churches, since it was a religious
condemnation of sodomy that originated the criminal law against it. The
apparatus of criminal law for LGBTIQ people thus rested on the sinful
label, and therefore the separation between church and state, as well as
privacy claims, were key in this area. That said, positive religion and
morality were also important, and religions were created9 0 as part of
mechanisms of social approval. 9 1 The criminal label speaks directly to
challenging sodomy laws, and showcases the uneasiness between private
and public behaviors, 92 discussed further below. Subversion was rooted
by stimulating LGBTIQ persons to get back into civil service, and
therefore contributing members of society.
Addressing these major labels, litigation has been a key tool deployed.
The result has been a LGBTIQ identity that, at least in the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) case, is "essentialized, privatized, victimized
and respectable," 93 reenacting many of these advocacy tropes. 94 But, for
litigation to be undertaken, there is the challenge of translating the
aspirations of a movement into individual claims and then translating the

87. Id. at 131.
88. STRYKER, supra note 1, at 122-23 (noting at 123 that "[i]n many respects, the

transgender movement's politics toward the medical establishment were more like those of the
reproductive justice movement than those of the gay liberation movement.").
89. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 139.

90. Id. at 142.
91. Id. at 145.
92. Id. at 148.
93. Ammaturo, supra note 81, at 576.
94. But the IACtHR has fought against those tropes in its latest pronouncement on the
matter, the Advisory Opinion 24 of 2017 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Gender identity, and equality and
non-discrimination with regard to same-sex couples. State obligations in relation to change of
name, gender identity, and rights deriving from a relationship between same-sex couples

(interpretation and scope of Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18 and 24, in relation to Article 1,
of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) No. 24 (Nov. 24, 2017) (hereinafter OC-24).
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95
outcomes of successful individual cases back onto a movement. That is
not always the case in domestic contexts, where rights cases often focus
96
on the organizations that bring them. But, internationally, the dynamics
are different, and cases center on identified and individualized victims,
with advantages and disadvantages. Individualization has been seen as
desirable in domestic litigation on LGBTIQ rights because "all too often,
the facts tended to fade into the background [therefore, denying the tragic
anecdote tactic]. Thus, rather than looking like a case about real people
and their lives, these cases tended to look more like a debate between
pundits on [television]."97 The same possibilities can be tapped into in
international contexts (if anything because there seldom are other
alternatives). 98
Historically, therefore, social movements have come together in the
pursuance of joint causes, or at least the idea that a victory for one
movement might pave the road for others when movements coalesce
around broader ideas of historical disenfranchisement. These have meant,
among other things, the use of the language of rights as a means to
advance these movements' ideals, since rights is a universal(izable)
language that can connect these groups, regardless of whether the claims
are for equal or special rights. And the language of rights, important as a
social mobilization tool, has also been complemented by specific and
strategic litigation, domestically and internationally, over rights. In this
scenario, the question remains as to how different rights are deployed,
and the bright and dark sides of those strategic choices for the specific
causes litigation seeks to advance.

1. International Rights Litigation Strategies
This section focuses on how rights are deployed in international
litigation to pursue the goals of historically disenfranchised groups. I
focus on international human rights law because of its broader appeal and
easier transferability across domestic and regional contexts. Other
advantages of the use of international human rights litigation is that it is
95. A concern expressed in the area of transgender rights, at least. See

STRYKER,

supra note

1, at 2-3.
96. KAPLAN, supra note 32, at 132.
97. Id. at 122.
98. But note that in the African system on human and peoples' rights, NGOs can bring cases
directly as complainants. See Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, Article 93 (2010); See also Rachel Murray & Frans Viljoen, Towards Non-

Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: The Normative Basis and Procedural
Possibilities Before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African
Union, 29 HuM. RTS. Q. 86, 106 (2007) (arguing that NGO advocacy networks in Africa have
recommended against pursuing this avenue, as it might result by an endorsement of homosexuality
being opposed to "African values" by the Commission, which would be a significant loss for the
movement).
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an avenue conceived of as an alternative to failing domestic institutions,
and one that seeks then to modify not only one state's behavior, but also
increasingly to send a message to other countries in the region (and even
the entire world) about the minimum standards of treatment of victims in
a comparable situation, through the systemic change effect of
international human rights judgments. 99
For present purposes, I do not distinguish between courts (that issue
binding judgments) and United Nations Treaty Bodies (that only have
recommendatory powers), since I am more interested in the discursive
effects of these judgments in relation to rights than in their enforceability.
I do note, however, that courts, because they are regional, present specific
features for available defenses against rights claims of LGBTIQ potential
victims, as discussed below.
I examine how different types of goals for a historically
disenfranchised group can be translated into the language of rights
protected in key general instruments on civil and political rights.
Economic, social, and cultural rights are excluded from this analysis for
two related reasons. First, despite the success of the LGBTIQ movement
in mobilizing state resources in domestic advocacy and strategic
litigation, international claims are couched primarily on civil and political
rights. And the second reason is that this grounding of claims on civil and
political rights is because international instruments creating (quasi-)
adjudicatory bodies contain only civil and political rights, with few
exceptions. 100 Therefore, the normative universe where LGBTIQ
international jurisprudence has developed is that of civil and political
rights, even if some cases have used equality to argue issues like social
security rights.101 As a result, redistribution matters are also largely off
the table in this article's sample, and that itself is one of the distorting
effects of litigation to pursue rights in international law.
This section uses litigation specifically concerning LGBTIQ rights to
highlight different (and sometimes contradictory) goals that can be
advanced through specific rights. I exclude instruments for specific
historically disadvantaged groups 0 2 since they are not necessarily
99. See generally Lucas Lixinski, Mechanisms of Systemic Change in Regional Human

Rights Courts: Swinging the Pendulum Between Legitimacy and Impact, 8 CAMBRIDGE INT'L L.
J. 60 (2019).
100. Those being the ACHPR, and the International Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which under a protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights is now empowered to hear individual complaints. See International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter ICESPR), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6
I.L.M. 368; Optional Protocol to ICESPR, Dec. 10, 2008, G.A. Res. 63/117.
101. Duque v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,

Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 310 (Feb. 26, 2016).
102. Examples include: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination (hereinafter

ICERD), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, at 47; Convention on the
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available to emerging movements (unless one uses intersectionality). A
key purpose of my intervention is to draw lessons for groups, like the
LGBTIQ movement, that do not have yet achieved a degree of
recognition in international human rights law that would lead to a specific
instrument.

An important structural caveat: this section works on the assumption
that we need to distinguish rights from the underlying goals that are
tactically labeled as specific rights.1 03 Therefore, this section is organized
around goals, rather than rights, helping unpack the different rights that
serve goals, and how privileging certain rights over others can lead to
blind spots and unintended consequences. There are overlaps between the
language of rights and goals in some respects (the goal of privacy is the
right to privacy, for instance). Still, in other contexts, the goal is separate
from the rights box, and it is precisely in those dissonances that we can
best observe the unintended consequences of rights mobilization (for
instance, decriminalization is also often translated in the language of the
right to privacy). While those compromises are inevitable in strategic
litigation and not unique to international human rights, they seem to be
enhanced with respect to human rights, given the more limited list of
rights that can be invoked (fundamentally restricted to the instrument that
gives jurisdiction to the adjudicatory body in question), 104 as opposed to
a much wider range of legal mechanisms and triggers domestically.
2. Privacy: To be Left Alone but also Invisible?
The earliest gay organization in the U.S. had both a privacy and a
respect "plank," 0 5 underscoring the importance of this tactic. The goal
of privacy translates naturally into a human right protected across all key
international instruments,106 with the notable exception of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The omission of privacy in the
African Charter was deliberate but unrelated to LGBTIQ rights, and some
07
argue that despite the deliberate omission, the right can be implied.1 In
the instruments in which the right does appear, there is a remarkable
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter CEDAW), Dec. 18,

1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) at 193; Convention on the Rights of the Child
(hereinafter CRC), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1456 (1989); International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families

(hereinafter CRMW), Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93, 30 I.L.M. 1517 (2003).
103.
104.
enlighten
Lixinski,

BOB, supra note 56, at 210.
Even when external treaties are used, they still need to be used only inasmuch as they
an existing right in the principal instrument being applied. For a discussion, see Lucas
Treaty Interpretationby the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at

the Service ofthe Unity of InternationalLaw, 21 EuR. J. INT'L L. 585 (2010).
105. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 37.
106. ACHR, art. 11; ECHR, art. 8; ICCPR, art. 17.
107. Murray & Viljoen, supra note 98, at 89.
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similarity of tests and scope of application in many cases, with variation
in scope only applying to cases where the limits of privacy or private life
are stretched to new scenarios. 108
Privacy as a goal and as a right has been an important means of
articulating a sphere beyond government interference with LGBTIQ
practices when governments are intent on actively persecuting LGBTIQ
people. Therefore, privacy and the invisibility it heralds can mean safety
in contexts that are more oppressive to LGBTIQ people. 109 The tactic
borrows perhaps most clearly from the women's rights movement, in that
it translates into control over personal autonomy, the creation of a sphere
of autonomy to the individual woman beyond the scrutiny of partners,
and most notably, the state's impulse to regulate morality. However, it
stands in tension with another goal of the women's rights movement, the
piercing of the public/private distinction to allow for government
interference to stop, prevent, and punish domestic violence.
Privacy is often characterized as the right to be left alone." 0 Because
of that, it has also come to mean the right to control one's own body (in
the feminist movement, a key issue of control over the body is abortion
rights). That connection was first developed in the context of women's
rights, but it was quickly adopted to mean broader control over sexuality
as well by the LGBTIQ movement. 11 1 The first Mardi Gras (1978) in
Australia" 2 had its politics characterized at least in part as being about
control over the body." 3 Therefore, it is to be expected that the early
victories of the LGBTIQ movement have been about privacy.

108. Lucas Lixinski, Comparative International Human Rights Law: An Analysis of the

Right to Private and Family Life Across Human Rights "Jurisdictions,"32 NoRDIc J. HUM. RTs.
99 (2014).
109. Michael O'Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and
InternationalHuman Rights Law: Contextualizing the Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HuM. RTs. L.
REV. 207, 214 (2008).
110. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193

(1890).
111. Of historical significance, note in this respect HiRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 3.
Being private, female relationships were extremely vulnerable to conform to a

heterosexual norm. The combination of economic independence and social
indifference that made a space for lesbian relationships in the late nineteenth
century was more like a brief window into the future than the beginning of a
social movement. Since women were never in command of the city streets the

way men were, women would have to wait decades before they got a toehold in
spaces like lesbian bars.
Therefore, the private has historically provided means of advancement through invisibility, but
also precluded inroads into public life.
112. In Sydney, Australia, the Mardi Gras parade is the Gay Pride parade.
113. Ross, supra note 29, at 88.
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4
Key cases in this regard are Dudgeon v. United Kingdom" and
Toonen v. Australia,"5 about the criminalization of sodomy in those two
countries. (De)criminalization is discussed in the next section, but it is
worth bearing in mind that in both of these cases, it was the articulation
of a private sphere beyond government interference that made a case for
the state to stop interfering (through criminal law) on practices
undertaken by consenting adults in the privacy of their homes. The
connection between sexual practices and privacy had the effect of
reinforcing sexual relationships as being outside the basic structure of
civil society-and also arguably privilege male homosexual acts over
other parts of the LGBTIQ spectrum.11 6 In their construction as privacy,
these victories meant protecting the right to be left alone, instead of a
right to be accepted in society. 1 7 These cases, as further discussed below,
focus on practices, doing little to advance identity, even if they were a
pivotal victory for the movement at the time.
Subsequent cases have discussed privacy in the LGBTIQ context as
the protection of identity more broadly, particularly in the context of
name changes for trans* persons. The Inter-American Court of Human
Right's (IACtHR) Advisory Opinion 24 stated that the protection of
private life is not limited to the right to privacy and that it includes dignity
and identity more broadly.1 1 8 The IACtHR indicated that "the concept of
private life includes aspects of physical and social identity, including the
rights to personal autonomy, personal development and the right to
establish and develop relationships with other human beings in the
outside world." 11 9 This expansive view of privacy to mean identity more
broadly is key in articulating LGBTIQ claims for recognition.
Finally, other cases also move the conversation away from practices
undertaken in private ("private life") to practices that have an impact on
society more broadly ("family life"). The IACtHR articulated the right to
family life connected not to the right to privacy, but a specific provision
on the protection of the family in the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR)1 20 in Atala Riffo v. Chile.121 In this case, the majority of
the IACtHR referred to a lesbian couple and their children as a family

114. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76 Eur. Ct. H. R., ECHR 5 [1981], Merits,
Just Satisfaction, Oct. 22, 1981.
115. Toonen v. Australia, Commc'n. No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992

(1994).
116. But see Suresh, supra note 12 (arguing that the "maleness" of the strategy does not
matter because of its effects across society).
117. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 315.
118. Also seen with respect to litigation in India. See Suresh, supra note 12.

119. OC-24, supranote 93, 187.
120. ACHR, Article 17.
121. Atala Riffo & Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.

Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012).
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that was entitled to protection 22-even if one judge disagreed with the
configuration of the couple and their children as a "family," advocating
for a more "traditional" reading of family as the heterosexual couple and
their children, and arguing that there was not enough consensus across
the Americas to support defining a same-sex couple and their children as
a family.1 2 3 The language of consensus plays a pivotal role in LGBTIQ
international rights litigation, as in other cases involving the evolution of
social mores.
The consensus doctrine is a key defense in privacy cases involving
LGBTIQ persons (or in cases involving LGBTIQ persons more broadly).
This doctrine, first developed by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR),1 24 is based on the idea that in matters where established human
rights in a treaty interact with emerging rights or areas of social policy or
morality, the adjudicating body may be guided by the consensus among
member states, or a broader international consensus, in delineating the
full scope of the right. Consensus becomes a source of legitimacy for the
adjudicating body (when it can be identified), while also being a defense
for the state (when there lacks consensus on an issue). In the area of
LGBTIQ rights, consensus has been used on issues as varied as
decriminalization, same-sex unions, registered partnerships, legal
recognition of gender reassignment, and the age of consent for
homosexual and heterosexual relations.1 2 5
The consensus doctrine is often combined with the margin of
appreciation doctrine in the European context, which is an articulation of
subsidiarity, or the idea that local authorities are in a better position than
international institutions to determine whether rights infringements have
happened per allowed limitations.1 26 Much like the consensus doctrine,
however, there is a question as to whether it applies in other contexts.1 27
122. Id. ¶¶ 172-78.
123. Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alberto Pdrez P6rez in the Judgment of Atala
Riffo & Daughters v. Chileinter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 239, q¶ 18-24 (Feb. 24, 2012).
124. The leading monograph treatment of the topic is KANSTANTSIN DZEHTSIAROU,
EUROPEAN CONSENSUS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2015).

125. Ragone & Volpe, supra note 15, at 480 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No.
7525/76 Eur. Ct. H. R., ECHR 5 [1981], Merits, Just Satisfaction, ¶ 61 (Oct. 22, 1981); Norris v.
Ireland, App. No. 10581/83 Eur. Ct. H. R.,¶46 (Oct. 26,1988); Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, App.
No. 30141/04 Eur. Ct. H. R., ¶ 63 (June 24, 2010) ; Hamalainen v. Finland [GC], App. No.
37359/09 Eur. Ct. H. R., ¶ 74 (16 July 2014); Vallianatos and others v. Greece, Apps. Nos.
29381/09 and 32684/09 Eur. Ct. H. R., ¶ 91 (Nov. 7, 2013); Christine Goodwin v. UK, App. No.
28957/95 Eur. Ct. H. R., ¶ 84 (July I1, 2002); L and V v. Austria, Apps. Nos. 39392/98 and
39829/98 Eur. Ct. H. R., Judgment, , 1 50 (Jan. 9, 2003).
126. Janneke Gerards, Margin ofAppreciation and Incrementalism in the Case Law of the
European Court of Human Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 495 (2018).

127. Amaury A Reyes-Torres, El Principiode Igualdady No Discriminaci6nComo Limite
al Margen de Apreciaci6n en el Reconocimiento del MatrimonioEntre Personasdel Mismo Sexo,
29(4) AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 761, 763 (2014).
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At any rate, the work that the margin of appreciation does for LGBTIQ
rights, and social movements more generally, is to attempt to divorce the
international from the domestic. But consensus plays a larger role in
articulating the position of international human rights law as a mechanism
for pressure onto domestic law and politics and is, therefore, a more
useful concept for present purposes.
The language of family life, and particularly its evolution from private
life, is more significant in the European context since it is built into the
language of the right to private and family life in the European
8
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).1 2 That use, however, is a doubleedged sword. Specifically, the language of privacy can be (and has been)
used to sidestep rights more grounded in citizenship, like marriage
equality. In Oliariv. Italy, for instance, the ECtHR sidestepped a claim
on the right to marry (Article 12 of the ECHR) in favor of a focus only
29
on the right to private and family life (Article 8 ECHR).1 Commentators
praised the judgment for expanding the focus of LGBTIQ rights beyond
just "private life," including "family life," which represented an advance
30 To make the issue of
compared with previous ECtHR case law.1
marriage equality about "family" somewhat broadens the scope of
privacy and adds marked public dimensions to it, so it is not a
development to be overlooked, as it moves the issue from a negative
13
sphere of rights towards positive obligations of the state. ' That said, it
still sidesteps the issue of the right to marry, with a clearer public
mandate, precisely as a means to contain the claim. Therefore, privacy as
a legal tactic can become counterproductive, as it has a pigeonholing
effect on the claims of the historically disadvantaged group represented
by the social movement and makes their existence severable from that of
mainstream society by encasing their identity as "practices" that happen
"in private." That is what Lelis and Galil have termed "monochromatic"
international law, unable to accommodate the diversity of colors in the
LGBTIQ rainbow flag and rendering diversity invisible by the focus on

privacy.132
LGBTIQ identity is often privatized for international rights litigation,
33
alongside it being essentialized, victimized, and made respectable.1 As
Ammaturo put it, one of the effects of these labels is to construct "a
128. ECHR, art. 8.

129. Oliari and Others v. Italy, App. Nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11 Eur. Ct. H. R., (July 21,
2015) (cited in Ragone & Volpe, supra note 15, at 460-61).
130. Ragone & Volpe, supra note 15, at 472-73. They are also wary of the "privatization of
homosexuality" that is done in the case, though.

131. Id. at 482.
132. Lelis & Galil, supra note 10, at 291; But see Suresh, supra note 12 (arguing that in
domestic litigation in India the meaning of privacy is distinct, and carries with it a public sphere
rendering, effectively moving privacy away from practices and towards identity).
133. Ammaturo, supra note 81, at 576.
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domesticated homosexual subject whose characteristics are presented as
being immutable, whose desires are to be sheltered from the public gaze,
who appears as a passive subject of rights rather than an active actor, and
whose behaviors do not overtly offend extant public (heteronormative)
morals."13 4 Further, privacy and its control effectively create pathways
for the control of capital flows connected to intimate relationships,
complicating the constitution of identity in ways that are difficult, if not
impossible, to capture in the context of a right like privacy or even family
life. 1
Nevertheless, the push for privacy played an important role in
pursuing LGBTIQ objectives in international human rights law. A key
victory was the decriminalization of same-sex conduct, which, because
of its idiosyncratic dimensions, deserves a separate analysis.
3. (De)Criminalization of Conduct: Becoming a Statistic
"Does not Imply Approval"
The relationship between LGBTIQ rights advocacy and criminal law
pursues two different avenues: the decriminalization of sexual practices;
and the criminalization of attacks against LGBTIQ persons.
Decriminalization is one of the normal early steps in LGBTIQ contexts,
and it is where the political battle for UN standard-setting has initially
focused,1 36 alongside de-Westernizing the debate and getting more states
from the Global South to spearhead or co-sponsor initiatives.1 37
Decriminalization is a key challenge, but also one that is treated with
relatively less systematicity by (quasi-)adjudicatory bodies.1 3 8
Decriminalization has historically been the specific target of test cases
domestically, an important part of rights mobilization strategies. Linda
Hirshman describes a case in which three couples (a gay couple, a lesbian
couple, and a straight couple) went to the police and asked to be arrested
because they had engaged in sodomy. The police refused to arrest them,
prompting the three couples to get a statement from the local District
Attorney saying the office, as a matter of policy, does not prosecute
private sexual acts. Unlike the use of privacy described above that aligns
with control over the body and feminist tactics in this respect, the use of
privacy to pursue decriminalization aligns with tactics pursued in the race
rights context. As Hirshman put it, "[these three couples], like much of
134. Id.
135. For this critique, see HARPER, supra note 40, at 20-21; see also YASMIN NAIR, Against
Equality, Against Marriage:An Introduction, in AGAINST EQUALITY: QUEER REVOLUTION NOT
MERE INCLUSION 15, 20 (Ryan Conrad ed., 2014) (arguing that "the family is the best way to

advance capitalism, as the base unit through which capitalism distributes benefits").
136. MARTEL, supranote 15, at 153.
137. Id. at 158.
138. Gerber & Gory, supra note 53, at 407.
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American social history since the sit-in at the Greensboro lunch counter,
worked by forcing the establishment to enforce its discriminatory lawsor to back down."1 39 The alignment with race rights underscores a public
element to the strategy, but, when translated to international law and
particularly privacy, that public element gets translated into prongs of the
proportionality test (that the restriction is required by law and in
pursuance of pressing social objectives) to underscore the inexistence of
a pressing social objective that would require discrimination against
LGBTIQ practices.
Decriminalization of LGBTIQ sexual conduct has thus often relied on
a combination of the rights to privacy and non-discrimination. A classic
example is Toonen v. Australia, in which the Human Rights Committee
(HRC), in 1994, used the right to privacy in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to make a case for decriminalizing
14 0 One of the Committee
sodomy in the Australian state of Tasmania.
Members issued a separate opinion in the case, though, arguing that the
41
case should have been decided on non-discrimination grounds,1
reflecting subsequently in concluding observations of the HRC on
142
decriminalization, connecting privacy and non-discrimination.
The focus on privacy and private life in the case law of the ECtHR
underscores a tension between privacy and morality, which, at least in
Dudgeon v. UK (about the decriminalization of sodomy), gets resolved
as tolerance,1 43 with the ECtHR stating that decriminalization "does not
imply approval."1 4 4 A key objective of strategic litigation thus centers on
focusing on LGBTIQ sexual practices as based on relationships just like
heterosexual bonds, and often even avoiding sexual terminology
altogether. 145 That said, Ammaturo has argued that this logic only worked
to the extent the victims portrayed themselves as precisely that. In other
contexts, in which those engaging in the sexual practice failed to portray
themselves as victims, cases failed (since they were then seen as
46
Therefore, being able to
perpetrators of sexual acts onto others).1
139. HiRsH-MAN, supra note 26, at 151.
140. Toonen v. Australia, Commc'n. No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992

(1994).
141. Individual opinion by Mr. Bertil Wennergren under rule 94, paragraph 3, of the Human
Rights Committee's rules of procedure, concerning the Committee's Views on communication

No. 488/1992 (Nicholas Toonen v. Australia).
142. Dominic McGoldrick, The Development and Status of Sexual Orientation
DiscriminationUnder InternationalHuman Rights Law, 16 HuM. RTs. L. REv. 613, 628 (2016).
143. Ammaturo, supra note 81, at 580.

144. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76 Eur. Ct. H. R., ECHR 5, 161 [1981].
145. CARPENTER, supra note 9, at 189 (on the comparison to heterosexual relationships) and
at 193-94 (on avoidance of sexual terminology).
146. Ammaturo, supra note 81, at 582 (citing Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. UK, Apps. No.

21627/93; 21628/93; 21974/93 Eur. Ct. H. R., Feb. 19, 1997).
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portray oneself as a victim helps decriminalize conduct. Likewise, it also
aids in helping LGBTIQ issues move from "practices" in isolation and
towards "identity," an important part of the move from rights based on
privacy to rights of participation in public life.
LGBTIQ advocates' move to decriminalize conduct is, therefore, an
important part of legal mobilization strategies. It means preventing the
state from enforcing laws that have no effect other than to oppress the
historically disadvantaged group. Part of the insight is that LGBTIQ
conduct is effectively LGBTIQ identity.1 4 7 But criminal law enforcement
is focused primarily on the negative obligations of the state, which,
although historically the core of civil and political rights, no longer mean
the full picture. Rather, there are positive obligations upon states that also
follow from international human rights law. To prosecute harm
experienced by individuals, whether at the hands of state agents or private
parties, is a key part of these positive obligations.
In the context of criminal law, compliance with positive obligations
means criminalizing actions against LGBTIQ persons. Much like
decriminalization, there is an alignment here with the race rights
movement, particularly with respect to the push for criminalization of
hate crimes.1 48 Another aspect of criminalization aligns with women's
rights advocates' move to criminalize marital rape and other forms of
domestic violence against women, which meant bringing private life
"into the world of democratic principles."1 49 The alignment with
women's rights in this instance has the important effect of piercing the
private sphere and underscoring its unintended consequences. While it is
generally good that the state does not interfere in private relations, it also
does not mean that the state should be able to wash their hands clean at
the expense of people whose oppression often happens in private.1 5 0
That said, there has also been a backlash against the over-use of
criminal law in the area of women's rights as a means of limiting and
controlling conduct in the name of paternalistic protections that ignore
broader claims for rights, economic power, and the unintended
consequences of criminalization and incarceration, mechanisms unlikely
to get to the root causes of rights violations."' Similar critiques have
emerged in the context of LGBTIQ rights. Specifically, radical queer
authors have asserted that the focus on criminalization for crimes against
LGBTIQ persons is unhelpful because: (1) jails are full not of dangerous
147. CARPENTER, supra note 9, at 109.
148. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 274-75.
149. Id. at 238.
150. See generally Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction:
Strategizing Women's Rights, 25 STUD. TRANSNAT'L LEGAL POL'Y 143 (1993).
151. Michelle Madden Dempse, Sex Trafficking and Criminalization:In Defense ofFeminist
Abolitionism, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1729 (2010).
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people, but of disenfranchised people the LGBTIQ community should be
aiming to help; (2) most violence happens domestically, not on the streets
(the focus of hate crimes legislation); (3) that the more important violence
to focus on is structural violence through the market; (4) that prisons are
places where physical violence is likely to be perpetrated, not redressed;
and (5) that criminalization feeds a criminal justice system that has itself
caused significant damage to LGBTIQ communities.' 5 2 Further, the
reliance on criminal law relies on paternalistic protection by the state,
which is inconsistent with the goals of autonomy of many LGBTIQ
advocates.1 53
For hate crime legislation, while there is no specific international
human rights litigation that could be found, they present an important
lesson that counters some of the individualistic critiques of international
human rights strategies and therefore are worth noting. The LGBTIQ
movement's tactic domestically has been to make the exercise less one of
adjudication and more a technical effort for the collection of statistics
(alongside Jewish organizations), pushing the LGBTIQ rights questions
to the background.' 54 As effective as it was outside of international
human rights law, this tactic also depersonalizes and dehumanizes the
victims, being one reason why policies like 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' in
the U.S. went ahead: LGBTIQ persons were not seen as humans, but
rather as cogs in the military mechanism. It was only the reengagement
of very individualized pain and suffering that allowed for policies based
on a collective group to be put to rest. 155 Therefore, even if international
human rights law and adjudication can be accused of demanding the.
individualization of cases at the expense of the goals of an entire
movement,1 56 this exercise of individualization can also render the
LGBTIQ movement visible and relatable in powerful ways for legal
mobilization.
In both these forms of engagement with criminal law, the move to the
public sphere is even more pronounced than in privacy rights' articulation
of the right to "family life," or private life as identity. Criminal law's
existence and enforcement shifts from being part of a state defense
towards it being the direct implementation of international human rights
obligations, which also helps drag these concerns to the center of
152. DEAN SPADE, Their Laws Will Never Make Us Safer, in AGAINST EQUALITY: QUEER
165, 167-69 (Ryan Conrad ed., 2014); see also JASON LYDON,
A Compilation of Critiques on Hate Crimes Legislation, in AGAINST EQUALITY: QUEER
REVOLUTION NOT MERE INCLUSION 177 (Ryan Conrad ed., 2014).
153. LYDON, supra note 152, at 180.
154. HIRSHMAN, supra note 26, at 273.
155. Id. at 285.
REVOLUTION NOT MERE INCLUSION

156. For a critique of individualization in the LGBTIQ crimes legislation context, see
YASMIN NAIR, Why Hate Crime Legislation is Still Not a Solution, in AGAINST EQUALITY: QUEER
REVOLUTION NOT MERE INCLUSION

199, 203 (Ryan Conrad ed., 2014).
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international human rights law adjudication. There are instances,
however, in which the articulation of visibility does not rely on a
connection to criminal law.
4. Presence in Public Life: The Limits of Visibility
Insertion into public life is key to move LGBTIQ causes from being
about conduct and towards identity more broadly. Visibility has been
central in other social movements, all of whom at one point or another
have made claims to the public arena, with suffrage in the race and gender
context being particularly powerful examples. Historically, though, these
two groups have been at odds with one another, often seeking to gain
suffrage and a presence in public life at the expense of one another. 157
In the LGBTIQ context concerning public life, at stake is the visibility
of LGBTIQ persons and claims. But this tactic, like the ones involving
privacy and the engagement with criminal law, requires victimization to
make the LGBTIQ person more fragile and therefore "palatable" or
acceptable to society at large; if you are fragile, there is no reason for
people to fear you and some reason for people to pity you. Likewise, this
tactic also requires respectability,1 58 which has been an ongoing issue in
the LGBTIQ movement, both catalyzing rights and alienating subgroups
and allies from other social movements. The move reflects, in part, a
generational shift in the LGBTIQ movement, too. In Australia, for
instance, Liz Ross identified a tension in tactics between privacy (taken
up by older LGBTIQ persons) and censorship (taken up by students and
other younger persons).15 9 Therefore, the assertion of LGBTIQ identity
in public life is a relatively new entrant to international rights tactics in
this movement.
Nonetheless, there are some promising examples of the insertion into
public life being used to promote LGBTIQ identity positively. In
Fedotova v. Russian Federation,160 the HRC engaged with the right to
freedom of expression in reaction to Russia's domestic law prohibiting
"propaganda of homosexuality." Specifically, it was of the view that the
state had violated the rights of Ms. Fedotova in expressing views publicly
supportive of homosexuality by displaying posters near a secondary

157. For a U.S.-centric discussion, see LAURA E. FREE, SUFFRAGE RECONSTRUCTED: GENDER,
RACE, AND VOTING RIGHTS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (2015). The same tensions occurred in South
Africa, as documented by Cheryl Walker, The Women's Suffrage Movement: The Politics of
Gender Race and Class, SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE: TOWARDS A PEOPLE'S HISTORY,

https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/womens-suffrage-movement-politics-gender-race-and-

class-cheryl-walker.
158. Ammaturo, supra note 81, at 584.
159. Ross, supranote 29, at 44.
160. Fedotova v. Russian Federation, CPR/C/106/D/1932/2010 Hum. Rts. Comm., Views

(1932/2010).
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school building. 161 In other words, cases like Fedotova protect a public
side to LGBTIQ identity, even in the face of legislation whose purpose is
to keep LGBTIQ identity restricted to private practices.
The jurisprudence on marriage equality, too, speaks to the public
visibility of LGBTIQ identity. While it revolves primarily around the
right to private and family life, and only in few instances it is directly
connected to rights detached from privacy, the recognition of the right to
marry for LGBTIQ persons is a key moment of public endorsement of
LGBTIQ identity. On this matter, views still differ across human rights
(quasi-)adjudicatory bodies, with the IACtHR having the clearest promarriage equality position, and as part of identity and a combination of
2
privacy and protection of the family. 16 In the European context, there is
a concerted effort to move litigation away from private life and towards
63
more public rights like the right to marry itself.'
The HRC's jurisprudence seems at the moment to be the least resolved
on this matter. In Joslin v. New Zealand,'64 the HRC narrowed down the
scope of the right to marry in the ICCPR 6 5 only to opposite-sex couples,
thus decoupling an important element of public life from LGBTIQ
causes, much like the ECtHR. Subsequent cases, however, have
66
challenged those views. G v. Australia1 involves a trans* woman who
stayed married to her female partner and sought to have her documents
corrected to reflect her gender identity. The HRC condemned Australian
67
authorities' refusal to do so, based on her right to privacy1 and the right
to non-discrimination.1 68 Another case involving Australia was about
whether Australian authorities needed to grant a divorce to a same-sex
couple married in Canada, where same-sex marriage was recognized
before Australia.1 69 The denial of access to divorce was argued based on
procedural rights1 70 and the right of non-discrimination, but the HRC
disregarded the claims under procedural rights. In other words,
discrimination is still treated as being a secondary rights claim which
ignores procedural rights arguments (the substantive or primary claim in
161. McGoldrick, supra note 142, at 630.
162. OC-24, supra note 94, T¶ 200-18.
163. ECHR, art. 12. See also Frances Hamilton, The Case for Same-Sex Marriage Before the
European Court of Human Rights, 65 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 1582 (2018).
164. Joslin and others v. New Zealand, Merits, Commc'n. No. 902/1999, U.N. Doc.

CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999, 10 IHRR 40, 1HRL 1719 (UNHRC) (July 17, 2002).
165. ICCPR, art. 23(2).
166. G

v.

Australia,

Merits,

Commc'n.

No.

2172/2012,

U.N.

Doc.

Commc'n.

No.

2216/2012,

U.N.

Doc.

CCPR/C/119/D/2172/2012 (Mar. 17, 2017).
167. ICCPR, art. 17.
168. ICCPR, art. 26.
169. C

v.

Australia,

Merits,

CCPR/C/1 19/D/2216/2012 (Mar. 28, 2017).
170. ICCPR, art. 14.
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this case).171 Therefore, the marriage equality debate in international
human rights litigation is still largely contained to one specific practice
(marriage), rather than LGBTIQ identity more broadly, and connections
to identity are still made largely on the basis of rights that instinctively
insulate LGBTIQ identity. There are thus still significant inroads for
LGBTIQ advocates to break away from the self-made contraptions of the
right to private life, and obtain broader, political, recognition of LGBTIQ
claims.
5. Accommodation of Difference and (Non)Discrimination: To be the
Same or Otherwise
Claims based on difference or sameness speak not only to issues like
marriage equality but more broadly to the matter of whether the purpose
of (international) human rights law advocacy is to carve out special rights
or to identify mechanisms of sameness. Unlike privacy, nondiscrimination is meant to entitle the group to "full and equal respect."1 7 2
That said, before international bodies like the ECtHR, non-discrimination
is something of a blind spot, as it requires systemic discrimination that in
some instances reaches the threshold of criminal conduct, which
effectively turns the right to non-discrimination into a criminalization
tactic, and consequently turns identity into statistics, much like the
criminalization tactic discussed above.1 73
There is an assumption, particularly in the area of marriage, that a key
objective of LGBTIQ people is to achieve equal rights.1 74 The fight for
marriage equality draws many parallels with earlier efforts in the race
rights contexts for the right to marry as well,1 75 which includes
unintended consequences. One of them is bringing the state to bear on the
regulation of private conduct (therefore, in tension with privacy goals).
Another downside is that in the LGBTIQ context, at least the focus on
marriage equality has meant for some critics a further "domestication" of
LGBTIQ persons, and a privileging of white middle-class interests over
the goals of further marginalized LGBTIQ communities.1 76 As put by one
queer radical author, "Gay marriage and voting are symbolic gestures that

'
171. For commentary on these cases, see Oscar I Roos & Anita Mackay, A Shift in the United
Nations Human Rights Committee's Jurisprudence on Marriage Equality? An Analysis of Two
Recent Communicationsfrom Australia, 42 UNSW L. J. 747 (2019).
172. Murray & Viljoen, supranote 98, at 91.
173. Ruth Rubio-Marin & Mathias M6schel, Anti-Discrimination Exceptionalism: Racist
Violence Before the ECtHR and the HolocaustPrism, 26 EUR. J. INT'L L. 881 (2015).
174. KAPLAN, supra note 32, at 66.
175. For this history, see generally KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF
MARRIAGE EQUALITY (2015).

176. For a collection of essays, see

AGAINST EQUALITY: QUEER REVOLUTION NOT MERE

INCLUSION (Ryan Conrad ed., 2014).
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77
reinforce structures while claiming to reconfigure them."1 And, while I
do not dispute the importance of this assertion, it is also worth noting the
possible unintended consequences of arguing on the grounds of nondiscrimination, and what gets missed by focusing on a specific
construction of equality.
Non-discrimination, or the right to be treated the same, speaks not
only to the private life of LGBTIQ persons but also to other forms of
public discrimination, such as job losses incurred by LGBTIQ persons
whose status was discovered.1 7 8 But here, like in the discussion on special
rights above, there remains a tension between rights gains and
(in)visibility. After all, in instances of job loss, one needed to have a job,
to begin with, and it was only LGBTIQ people who could "pass" as
heteronormative that would gain employment. Therefore, the language of
non-discrimination in this context privileges a specific type of LGBTIQ
identity, that is (under-) performed for the sake of the rest of society, at
the exclusion of certain segments of the LGBTIQ spectrum itself.
Other social movements have used equality and non-discrimination in
potentially more radical ways. In the context of Indigenous rights, for
instance, advocates have used the prohibition of discrimination to mean
not a duty of the state to promote equality across the board, but in fact, to
accommodate cultural differences. 179 International human rights law,
therefore, contains within the possibility of promoting substantive
equality that challenges essentialized identities in favor of thick
descriptions of difference. The problem seems to be that LGBTIQ cases
have fallen short of tapping into that potential.
. Accommodation of difference is, therefore, one area in which.
constructions of equality and non-discrimination largely fail LGBTIQ
victims. As indicated above, in the ECtHR context, the identity of
80
LGBTIQ claimants is often essentialized and made respectable.1 That
often means that, particularly for trans* persons, their identity ends up
erased in favor of biology (the transsexual who undergoes reassignment
surgery is preferred),181 and a specific heteronormative understanding of

177. ERIC A STANLEY, Marriage is Murder: On the Discursive Limits of Matrimony, in
29 (Ryan Conrad ed., 2014).

AGAINST EQUALITY: QUEER REVOLUTION NOT MERE INCLUSION 27,

178. RosS, supra note 29, at 45.
179. Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 51 (June 17, 2005); see also L6pez Alvarez v.
Honduras, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 141 (Feb. 1,
2006) (using this obiter dicta from Yakye Axa to make a case for the accommodation of
Indigenous laiguages in prison).
180. Ammaturo, supra note 81, at 576.
181. But the case law has evolved, both in the European and Inter-American contexts. See
DAMIAN A GONZALEZ-SALZBERG, A Queer Approach to the Advisory Opinion 24/2017 on LGBT
Rights,

in

RESEARCH

TRADITIONAL PARADIGM

METHODS FOR INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS

LAW:

BEYOND THE

107, 110 (Damian A Gonzalez-Salzberg & Loveday Hodson eds., 2019).
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what it means to be trans* (an assumption that trans* people are
heterosexual). 8 2 In other words, accommodation of identity can still be
problematic in the rather fixed categories of international human rights
law, at least when some assumptions about the aspirations of LGBTIQ
people (in this case, sameness) are made.
In Duque v. Colombia,183 a gay man was denied access to public
benefits following the death of his partner, making the case hinge on nondiscrimination in access to rights. The IACtHR decided the case by
drawing a definition of discrimination from instruments on race and
gender. 184 The court also derived equality from human dignity, thus
rendering it a fundamental norm of international human rights law."8 5
After reaffirming the finding in Atala Riffo v. Chile that LGBTIQ status
is a protected category under the norm prohibiting discrimination,1 86 the
court drew on domestic practices across the region (so, consensus
reasoning) to support the proposition that social security benefits for
same-sex couples should be guaranteed under anti-discrimination law.1 87
The decision has been criticized for being pursued despite changes to
Colombian domestic law before the case reaching the IACtHR that
rendered the case largely moot. 188 But it is important in that it reaffirms
Atala Riffo's proposition that the lack of regional consensus is not a
sufficient reason to deny LGBTIQ persons the full gamut of human
rights. 189
Another important case in the Inter-American system is FlorFreirev.
Ecuador,190 which returns the issue of discrimination to (one aspect of)
the private sphere. In this case, a military police officer was allegedly
caught engaged in sexual acts with another man and disciplined and
ultimately dismissed. The state of Ecuador, taking into account the Atala
Riffo judgment, apologized to the victim and proceeded to make
reparations. It, however, refused to acknowledge its responsibility for the
breach of international law, which forced the IACtHR to issue a judgment
182. For this critique, see Damian A. Gonzalez-Salzberg, The Accepted Transsexualandthe
Absent Transgender:A Queer Reading of the Regulation of Sex/Gender by the European Court
of Human Rights, 29 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 797, 819 (2014).
183. Duque v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,

Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 310 (Feb. 26, 2016).
184. Id. ¶ 90 (citing ICERD and CEDAW).
185. Id.191.
186. Id. ¶¶ 104-05.
187. Id. ¶¶ 112-19.
188. Jorge Contesse, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Inter-American Human

Rights Law, 44 NC. J. INT'L L. 353, 374 (2019).
189. Duque v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 310,

¶ 123 (Feb. 26, 2016) (citing

Atala Riffo & Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R

(ser. C) No. 239,

¶ 92 (Feb. 24, 2012)).

190. Flor Freire v. Ecuador,

Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs,

Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 315 (Aug. 31, 2016).
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on the merits.1 9 ' The IACtHR used the case as a platform to discuss the
matter of discrimination 'by perception,' 1 92 as well as the ties between
discrimination and criminalization of conduct (in this case, the
193 But the
disciplinary proceedings Mr. Flor Freire had to undergo).
IACtHR was also asked to address a third key tactic of LGBTIQ rights,
and this time turned against LGBTIQ identity. Specifically, the court was
asked to rule on whether the victim being accused of being gay (and that
being grounds for his dismissal) was a violation of his honor (protected
94
in the same provision of the ACHR that covers privacy).1 The court
treaded carefully to say that, because of the consequences of the
imputation of LGBTIQ identity (the victim's dismissal and disciplinary
95
proceedings), his honor had been violated.1 But, in doing so, the
IACtHR embraces in the area of non-discrimination also an assumption
that LGBTIQ persons have to be respectable, and that to be identified as
LGBTIQ can in itself be otherwise.
Flor Freire v. Ecuador, therefore, brings several of the analytical
strands of LGBTIQ international human rights adjudication together and
in tension with one another. The case is simultaneously about nondiscrimination, criminalization, and honor and privacy, while also
connecting to the problems of "passing" and "freeriding," discussed
above. All these rights are meant to be self-reinforcing and protective of
LGBTIQ identity. Still, they have the effect of subordinating the
prohibition of non-discrimination to LGBTIQ identity that is respectable,
that "passes," and even admitting that the suggestion of LGBTIQ status
can be a violation of human rights. In other words, LGBTIQ identity is
acceptable and even celebrated, but only as long as it does not challenge
the status quo of non-LGBTIQ persons. Non-discrimination becomes
sameness, rather than the accommodation of difference.
As a counterpoint, however, the IACtHR's Advisory Opinion 24
challenges a lot of assumptions in international human rights LGBTIQ
jurisprudence. It starts by unpacking the binaries of heterosexual v.
homosexual, indicating that LGBTIQ identity is "a conceptual dynamical
eminently changeable and in constant revision." 19 6 Because of that,
classifying LGBTIQ persons in essentializing ways should be carefully
avoided, and the court's opinion should be read as using these conceptual
categories in broad terms and avoiding reductionist categorizations. 97 In
doing so, the court challenges many of the assumptions about LGBTIQ
191. Contesse, supra note 188, at 378.
192. Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 315,

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

¶

122 (Aug. 31, 2016).

Id.¶ 123.
ACHR, art. 11.
Flor Freire v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 315, 11 155-58 (Aug. 31, 2016).
OC-24, supra note 94, 1 31.
Id.
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identity discussed in the jurisprudence so far and widens the scope of
possible claims. The IACtHR also discusses the scope of discrimination
as being based on official and unofficial policies alike,1 9 8 and coming
from state and non-state sources.99 The court thereby opens the door for
the broader recognition of LGBTIQ identity in its own terms, trying to do
away with the reference point of non-LGBTIQ identity and standards of
respectability. This opinion, the current high watermark of LGBTIQ
international rights jurisprudence, can be highly influential in undoing a
lot of the traps of this social movement, and can be useful in other social
movement contexts as well in dispelling the illusion that the key
aspiration of social movements is sameness and "integration" into a
perceived "normal" or "mainstream" society. In other words, this
opinion's take on equality and non-discrimination, alongside the
complexity of LGBTIQ identities, can be a powerful leverage to unlock
more radical possibilities of international human rights adjudication for
social movements.
While the move away from practices and towards identity is very
welcome, there are still contexts in which these rights come as luxuries,
and the primary focus of advocates is on protecting the life of LGBTIQ
persons. Therefore, the next subsection discusses the right to life as
encompassing overarching goals of safety and beyond, particularly its
latest iterations that attempt to imbue it with identity-serving elements
that may present a better alternative to LGBTIQ advocates than rights
based on privacy.
6. Life and Physical Integrity: Dignified Life and the Public
LGBTIQ Body
The category of "life" as legally protected is an umbrella for a range
of claims, and it is particularly important in contexts in which the lives of
LGBTIQ persons are threatened by oppressive state and non-state actors.
The right to life is useful in contexts in which the lives of LGBTIQ people
are threatened, particularly if these violations can be made out to be part
of a broader pattern of discrimination as a result of which LGBTIQ
people are targeted simply for being LGBTIQ, drawing parallels from
international jurisprudence on feminicide. 200 Advisory Opinion 24 of the
IACtHR also recognizes the connection to the right to life and physical
integrity, 2 0 ' and particularly the psychological integrity of LGBTIQ

persons. 2 02

198. Id. ¶ 39.
199. Id. ¶ 40.
200. See generally GonzAlez et al. ("Cotton Field") v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection,

Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).
201. OC-24, supra note 94,

1 47.

202. Id. ¶48.
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A key advantage of using rights like the right to life and physical
integrity, compared to rights like private life, non-discrimination, and
even freedom of expression, is that the former two rights do not admit
limitations as readily as the latter. In other words, an interference with the
right to life puts a heightened burden on the state to justify the
interference, even if the threshold for an interference to be characterized
is harder. The right to life and physical integrity, therefore, bypass
arguments about state discretion and the lack of a regional consensus
more easily than other rights used by international human rights
advocates.
The Human Rights Committee has recently interpreted the right to life
in the ICCPR 203 to mean not only the absence of the arbitrary loss of life
2
but also the right "to enjoy a life with dignity." 04 That view means an
expansive interpretation of the right to life, which results in the right to
life not being absolute. 20 1 Specifically, deprivation of life is considered
to violate international human rights law if it is arbitrary, and the test for
arbitrariness involves elements of "inappropriateness, injustice, lack of
predictability, and due process of law [...] as well as elements of
2 06
reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality."
The HRC put particular emphasis on the need for states to adopt
special measures to protect the right to life of "persons in situations of
vulnerability," which expressly include LGBTIQ persons. 207 Likewise,
the right to life is connected to the prohibition of discrimination in
international human rights law, again specifically for LGBTIQ
persons. 2 08 In broadening the scope of the right to life to include a
dignified life and connecting it to non-discrimination, therefore, the
General Comment opens a new avenue for LGBTIQ advocates to pursue
cases that, while achieving many desirable outcomes from a legal
advocacy standpoint (clear, individualized victimhood connected to a
context of discrimination, limited defenses available to the state), does
not suffer from the discursive biases of rights like privacy, or even nondiscrimination in isolation.
The right to physical integrity can also be useful in this connection,
not only because it feeds into the right to life, but because it has
autonomous dimensions. It can be interpreted to include both physical
and mental suffering, and it is particularly relevant in articulating
203. ICCPR, art. 6.
204. General Comment No. 38 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30,
2018), ¶ 3.
205. Id. 110.
206. Id. 112.
207. Id. ¶23.
208. Id. ¶ 61.
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reparations to victims, both at an individual level and in terms of
guarantees of non-repetition capable of achieving systemic reform and
legislative change at the domestic level. Further, the right to physical
integrity is especially relevant for trans* and intersex advocates, with
respect to surgical interventions implemented ostensibly to "correct" sex
deviations that need no correcting. 209 Thus, while focused primarily on
the physical body and the biological existence of LGBTIQ persons, there
are important identity-driven ripple effects of litigation based on the right
to life and physical integrity that are worth exploring further in litigation.
The discussion above of different rights tactics has underscored the
potentials and pitfalls of multiple rights, some of which serve multiple
functions concerning LGBTIQ international human rights law advocacy
and rights mobilization. It also shows how, in practice, tactics gleaned
from other social movements have been replicated and built upon by
LGBTIQ advocates. The next section discusses whether and how do these
findings for LGBTIQ persons and their rights translate back to thinking
about social movements in other (particularly emerging) contexts.
II. A ROADMAP FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION?
This Article has focused thus far on how different social movements
flowed into the LGBTIQ movement as a relative newcomer to the scene,
while simultaneously exploring the trade-offs of pursuing goals framed
in the language one right over other rights and identity claims-a point
of confluence. This section focuses on what the LGBTIQ movement, and
its legal mobilization strategies in international human rights (quasi-)
adjudication, can do as their ideas flow onto other, emerging movements.
For example, trans* advocates have argued that they identify themselves
with groups such as disability rights, 21 0 meaning there are avenues for
social movements beyond LGBTIQ to learn from and intersect with this
movement, despite its specificities pointed out above.
Choosing the path of human rights is not always a clear choice.
Frederic Martel, in the LGBTIQ context, pointed out a difference
between "hard" and "soft" defenses of human rights, depending on the
context. Specifically, certain contexts are more likely to respond to
"hard" human rights arguments based on LGBTIQ identity and values
and rights. These are contexts that are riper for LGBTIQ rights reform,
or where resistance is relatively smaller (usually spaces where
criminalization is no longer an issue, or at least criminal laws on the
books are not enforced). In contexts where there is more resistance, a
"soft" human rights approach, based on culture, communication, and
209. Tony Briffa, Intersex Surgery DisregardsChildren's Human Rights, 428 NATURE 695
(2004); Kirsten Sandberg, The Rights of LGBTI Children Under the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 33 NORDIC J. HUM. RTs. 337 (2015).
210. STRYKER, supra note 1, at xii.
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isolated LGBTIQ practices, is more appropriate, according to him. 21' But,
if legal mobilization through international human rights (quasi-)
adjudication is on the table, then there are a few issues to take into
account.
Martel's categorization is useful in thinking about sequencing. While
other authors have written about it, 2 12 I wish to resist being particularly
prescriptive, since I am not focusing on one specific minority for this
section. Nonetheless, it is important to note the difference Martel makes
between identity and practices, and how practices are upheld at an earlier
stage in the fight for the rights of this minority, to only then focus on
identity issues. There seems, therefore, to be a flow from the private
towards the public: an initial step is to think of protecting practices
undertaken in private, to only then focus on the broader identity of the
affected minority, which speaks more broadly to issues of belonging,
citizenship, and substantive equality and non-discrimination. One of the
risks of the move from practices to identity is that, in the context of
international human rights adjudication, it may lead to the essentialization.
of identity, much in the same way international adjudication of
Indigenous rights has done, under the banner of "strategic
essentialism." 21 3 That said, essentialization, while it must be resisted in
favor of thick descriptions, is also to a certain extent the price to pay for
engagement with the human rights system, and will always be there in
some form. The problem in this respect is more one with the forums and
forms of international human rights (or even litigation more broadly) than
with the movements themselves.
The LGBTIQ movement's engagement with international human
rights instruments and processes has underscored some of the limitations
of established categories of human rights, which might be read as making
a case for the "special character" of rights in this area, and the nontransferability of insights gained therein to other social movements.
However, the struggle for special rights, or the recognition of identity in
terms of the movement themselves, is by no means an isolated feature of
the LGBTIQ movement, as scholarship on disability rights and the rights
of older persons has shown. 214 Specifically, the development of rights
211. MARTEL, supra note 15, at 256-57.
212. Kees Waaldjik, Standard Sequences in the Legal Recognition of Homosexuality
Europe's Past, Presentand Future, 4 AUSTRALASIAN GAY AND LESBIAN L. J. (1994).
213. ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE, supra note 80. I am thankful to Damian Gonzalez-

Salzberg for this insight.
214. See generally Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007)
(arguing for the existence of a disability rights model that challenges assumptions about the role

of human rights); Fredric M6gret, The DisabilitiesConvention: Towards a Holistic Concept of
Human Rights, 12 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 261 (2008) (arguing that the regime on persons with
disabilities in international human rights law bridges a number of assumed dualities or
dichotomies in the field of international human rights law more broadly, and is thus useful to
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jurisprudence and standard-setting by social movements representing
historically disadvantaged groups can challenge and modify aspects of
international human rights law not only with respect to the group's
interests but potentially also have spillover effects onto international
human rights standards applying beyond the specific group.
In other words, a call for special rights and recognition of identity is
not only a way of advancing human rights for a specific group. Still, it
can have significant impacts on the possibilities of human rights law and
these treaties as "living instruments," still valid to new and emerging
needs and movements. That is not to say that there are no downsides to
using the established categories, as the previous section has shown. The
use of privacy to unpack and combat the effects of criminal law is one
example. A key downside is that the need to demonstrate difference,
central for the making of the movement, ultimately belies the overall
emancipatory objective. 215 But that is the reason why many groups push
for new instruments. LGBTIQ advocates themselves speak of creating
specific instruments, 2 16 even if more efforts at present seem to be in
litigation and including LGBTIQ perspectives in existing human rights
law. An area in which there is less jurisprudence, but a greater push
towards standard-setting, is the rights of older persons, and it offers a
useful comparator for many of the main issues discussed in this Article.
The current movement for the rights of older persons seeks to create
a new instrument. It confronts similar questions to those in the LGBTIQ
context, ranging from the essentialization of the category (aging is very
diverse and elastic) 2 17 to the matter of protecting rights ranging from
privacy to participation in public life and broader social awareness and
public participation. 2 18 Importantly, too, like LGBTIQ rights at first and
disability rights now, the rights of older persons movement also mobilizes
economic resources of the state in ways that older social movements
could not.2 1 9
Older persons have been more successful in working towards a
specific instrument, but, as Herro and Byrnes have pointed out, the use of
human rights was not a certainty, even if it has become the prevailing

rethinking the entire field); see also Annie Herro & Andrew Byrnes, Transcending the Framing
Contests over the Human Rights of Older Persons, AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript on file, cited with permission).
215. See generally Ernesto Laclau, EMANCIPATION(S) (1996). I am thankful to Caroline

Compton for this insight.
216. MARTEL, supra note 15.
217. FREDERIC MCGRET, The Elderly,
(Thomas Cushman ed., 2010).

in THE ROUTLEDGE INT'L HANDBOOK OF HUM.

RTS.

218. Herro & Byrnes, supra note 214.
219. Annie Herro, The Human Rights of Older Persons: The Politics and Substance of the

UN Open-Ended Working Group on Ageing, 23
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language. 220 Thinking of articulation as human rights as a contingent
choice is an important reminder of how social movements mobilize
around myriad platforms, and international human rights is only one of
them. Further, international human rights language can have a deleterious
effect in countries that are particularly hostile to the internationalization
of these issues, and other tactics may be more useful in mobilizing and
producing action. 22 1 Therefore, international human rights law and
institutions serve a movement from their perspective, rather than the other
way around.
Negotiations in the area of the rights of older persons are stalled, in no
small part because of a tendency to frame the rights of older persons as
suffering from a normative gap. The normative gap frame on the surface
seems to perform a similar function to the idea of special rights, in that it
underscores what is special about a group and how the existing
framework is not fit for purpose. But it also leads to problems in political
negotiations and mobilizing advocacy. Therefore, an alternative frame
that focuses on the relative invisibility of a historically marginalized
group might be preferable. 2 2 2 A "relative invisibility" frame does the
same work as the move away from rights-based on privacy and towards
recognition of identity in a public sense. It underscores that the claim for
special rights is not necessarily one based on a normative gap, but one
that a thick description of the reality of the historically disadvantaged
group can resolve. It also shows that engaging rights based on privacy
does little to address many of the issues at stake for a historically
disadvantaged group, like their place in public life and social and
economic rights.
There are some additional blind spots and pitfalls to be aware of and
negotiate that speak less to specific tools and more to the use of
international human rights more broadly. The professionalization of legal
mobilization using international human rights mechanisms, for instance,
is both a weapon and a liability. 2 2 3 As Tilly has suggested, the
professionalization of social movements is a key trend in the 21st century,
224
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with
concern
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international human rights, an unintended consequence of which is that
one stops focusing on the problem to focus on the field instead. 225 Rights
piggybacking, therefore, can narrow the possibilities of the use of rights
language, as the discussion above also shows. At the same time, it is the
professional language of human rights that forces piggybacking since
movements need to rely on a relatively closed set of rights provisions
within which claims need to "fit." All the while, the use of rights
discourse can "become so powerful it takes up all available space for
talking about justice," 226 meaning it can obfuscate claims for identity and
redistribution that do not fit well within the essentialized boxes of
strategic litigation.
Further, and back to the matter of international human rights law being
only one option among many for social movements, the (over)use of
international human rights mechanisms runs the risk of fraying the social
fabric, "leading to individualist dissensus that ignores the common
good." 2 27 It can also discount the voices of social movements themselves
if the rhetoric is imposed solely from the outside (less likely in the context
of adjudication, since it requires a victim bring a case). In systems similar
to the European model, where the consensus doctrine is often used to
build bottom-up support for emerging rights of social movements,
particularly
in areas affecting morality and social policy,
internationalization itself may backfire. 2 2 8 Even if the doctrine is not
deployed everywhere, or at least not using domestic law as a basis for
legitimacy, 2 2 9 it still speaks to the challenges of using international
litigation to promote largely domestic change in the rights of historically
disadvantaged groups. However, there is literature suggesting that
targeted litigation in the LGBTIQ area against one country can
"substantially increase the probability of national-level policy change"
throughout an entire region. 30 Social movements need to decide whether
the use of international mechanisms makes sense to promote change in
225.
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Persons, 18 GLOBAL NETWORKS: J. TRANSNAT'L AFF. 625 (2018) (arguing that social movement
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the absence of support domestically or at least in neighboring or
comparable countries.
There is no clear roadmap for social movements to create new
instruments or to advance international jurisprudence for their interests
as a means of promoting domestic or regional change. That said, there are
issues that clearly must be taken into account. These include the
relationship between public and private, which also speaks to the
protection of practices versus identity; the choice between pre-existing
rights and mechanisms, as opposed to new standard-setting; the uses of
the international as a means of forcing domestic change across a region,
and therefore short-circuiting stalled domestic politics versus the
backlash against international interference; and more broadly, whether
the use of international human rights language is to be done as a "soft" or
"hard" tactic.
With respect to choosing existing mechanisms, the LGBTIQ example
underscores the potentials and pitfalls of relying on existing instruments,
and how they can reify identity and fall under traps that can prevent
structural change in international human rights. The reliance on existing
mechanisms can be a steppingstone in the struggle for special rights, but
it would seem that the fight for special rights should not be abandoned in
the name of sameness. That is not to say sameness should not be on the
table for members of a historically oppressed group. Still, it is important
to underscore that it often is not available or is just not a desirable choice.
Making compromises for the sake of results in legal mobilization can
fragment movements and leave behind those who need the protection of
international human rights law the most, in favor of relatively privileged
segments of a movement. Legal mobilization by social movements can
thus enshrine and reinforce (relative) privilege in problematic ways, and,
while they can be a pragmatic means of moving the discussion along,
they should not be the endgame.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

International human rights (quasi-)adjudicatory institutions are
important sites of tactics for emerging social movements. International
human rights law's counter-majoritarian instincts offer a welcoming
haven for historically disadvantaged groups. And these movements share
tactics, piggybacking because on the ground they have often found allies
in one another, and internationally as an echo of those alliances and the
fact they technically share a limited array of rights in the instruments
being adjudicated. Tactics travel across social movements can influence
how new ones establish tactics and strategies, as well as the potentials
and pitfalls of certain argumentative lines.
Legal mobilization draws on those interactions and individualizes the
claims of movements, which works to humanize the historically
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disadvantaged group, but also can foreground certain interests at the
expense of others. More "respectable" victims, and essentialized
identities, come into play as tactical ploys, which also undermine the
movement's possibilities of promoting the change they sought to
promote. International human rights law instruments and mechanisms
can go from becoming a tool among many to having constitutive framing
effects, narrowing down the possible claims of a movement. While a
victory for one can be construed as a victory for the entire movement, the
reality is that the "chosen" victims and their interests necessarily
background other aspects of a movement, and leave them behind as a
victory more often than not leads to the search for the next victory over a
different claim, rather than an expansion of the existing victory to
accommodate greater swathes of the movement.
The LGBTIQ example underscores those tensions, and it also shows
the tendency to start with the articulation of a protected private sphere,
followed by attempts to engage visibility and public life. Starting with the
private sphere, however, produces ripple effects that become a burden on
subsequent litigation, which will tend to refer back to the private realm,
and therefore specific practices, at the expense of broader identity-based
claims. International human rights law, thus, in a way adopts a tunnel
vision and becomes monochromatic.
Emerging and future social movements that rely on legal mobilization
and strategic litigation in international human rights fora would do well
to rethink this path dependency and attempt to upend the rights paradigm
from the start. International human rights law does contain the potential
to acknowledge and celebrate identity, and emerging approaches like the
right to a dignified life can prove to be a useful way to break path
dependency. That way, international human rights law and institutions
can serve those within a historically disadvantaged group upon whom the
law bears most harshly, as opposed to the easy wins which, while
desirable in the short term, can have lasting consequences in
pigeonholing a movement and constricting its possibilities.
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